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Abstract
We consider the dynamics of knowledge-based sources of advantage as they move between
geographical locations and multinational and other firm level networks using the specialist
context of Formula 1 motor over a fifty nine year period. We suggest that shifts in
competitive advantage are underpinned by the movement of both architectural and component
knowledge at both the firm and cluster level, and in particular we suggest that isolated firms
can both benefit from and add to cluster level knowledge. We conclude by suggesting ways in
which MNEs can adapt their approach to both location and knowledge development in order
to enhance their ability to create competitive advantage.
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31. Introduction
An important development in the study of multinational firms and knowledge-based
competitive advantage in recent years is the recognition that unique, rent-generating
knowledge can be found in many locations around the globe. No longer are multinational
firms assumed to be interested in foreign locations only as potential markets for goods and
services embodying knowledge developed in the home country; rather, they are explicitly
found to use these locations as sources of innovative knowledge (Tallman and Fladmoe-
Lindquist, 2002). If such knowledge can be absorbed by the multinational through a local
subsidiary or joint venture operation and then transmitted to the rest of the firm for
combination with knowledge from yet other locations (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000), the
multinational firm can create the kind of idiosyncratic firm-specific capabilities that generate
sustained competitive advantage (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004). Further, this specialized
knowledge is no longer seen as widely available throughout host nations, but rather as
concentrated in specialized city-regions, industrial districts, or geographical clusters (Porter,
1998).
This study uses the concepts of architectural and component knowledge (Matusik and
Hill, 1998; Tallman, Jenkins, Henry and Pinch, 2004) to examine the movement of
knowledge within and between firms in such geographical industry clusters in order to
improve our understanding of how multinational firms can access, internalize, and
reconfigure sticky, location-tied knowledge into unique firm-specific capabilities. Previous
work has suggested that clusters or proximate networks of firms can offer sources of sustained
competitive advantage to the firms (including the subsidiaries of multinational firms) residing
within them (Porter, 1998; Pinch, Henry, Jenkins and Tallman, 2003). In this study we
consider further the dynamics of knowledge based sources of competitive advantage both
among firms within geographical clusters and between firms and groups of firms in different
4locations. To do so, we focus on the technological innovations and the relative competitive
advantage of clusters and cluster-based firms using the specialized context of Formula 1 (F1)
motor racing over a fifty-nine year period between 1950 and 2008. We use a guided inductive
approach by considering a series of propositions to interrogate longitudinal case study data.
We observe both the emergence and transitions over time of clusters and of firm-level inter-
cluster networks and are able to consider how such shifts enable the creation of new forms of
knowledge which lead to competitive advantage.
2. The Geography of Knowledge and Competitive Advantage
The concept that regionally-tied advantage might arise from a combination of unique
knowledge assets is the basis for a variety of models of industrial districts or clusters in
economic geography (Saxenian, 1994; Maskell 2001) and strategic management (Porter,
1998; Tallman et al, 2004). While the application of cluster concepts to technology-intensive
industries is evolving, most models assume that core knowledge is sticky – tightly bound to
its originating location – leading to sustainable competitive advantage for firms within a
cluster (Lawson, 1997). Other work proposes that isomorphic pressures will lead to
knowledge convergence among the firms in a region leading to a tendency for the focus of
innovation to narrow over time, thereby resulting in a move away from more radical
breakthrough innovations (Damanpour, 1991). Location-based determinism for the
knowledge attributed to a particular region makes change appear to be at best difficult and at
worst impossible, such that embedded regional sources of advantage become sources of
disadvantage over time as the regions, and likewise the firms within them, are unable to
respond to change (Pouder and St. John, 1996).
We propose, though, that the knowledge base in any cluster can evolve through
innovation, rather than stagnate or lose value through inter-regional imitation. One way in
which the capabilities found in clusters evolve is through spillovers and re-combination of
5ideas to stimulate development among firms within the regional cluster. Another possibility is
the migration of knowledge from one location to others, often through active intervention by
multinational firms. While differences in knowledge stocks may act as isolating mechanisms
to slow knowledge flows between regions (Pinch et al., 2003), these geographical clusters of
companies are not, in fact, completely isolated, and knowledge flows between regions within
an industry play key roles in the evolution of industry knowledge stocks and the shift over
time of competitive advantage.
2.1. Defining Knowledge Types
Tallman et al. (2004) consider knowledge development at both the firm and the cluster level
using the notion of component and architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990;
Matusik and Hill, 1998). They propose that these two distinctive types of knowledge have
both firm-specific and cluster-specific effects. Architectural knowledge in particular is seen
to be highly path-dependent and immobile, and therefore limited in flow across firm or cluster
boundaries (Tallman et al., 2004). Component knowledge flows are enhanced within a firm or
cluster by common cluster-level architectural knowledge, while different – often competing –
sets of architectural knowledge between organizations or clusters act as isolating mechanisms
to slow the movement of component knowledge across boundaries (Pinch et al., 2003).
Component knowledge consists of those specific knowledge resources, skills, and
technologies that relate to the component parts of an organizational system rather than to the
whole (Tallman et al., 2004). Component knowledge is tied normally to the technology of the
industry and is relatively coherent and definable rather than personal or historical, and
therefore is potentially transferable to informed individuals and organizations, who will find it
understandable once presented to them (McGaughey, 2002). However, not all component
knowledge is equally easy to absorb, even for firms in similar situations, as it may run from
the simple and explicit to the fairly complex and tacit.
6Architectural knowledge relates to an entire system of knowledge and the structures and
routines for integrating its component knowledge into patterns for productive use and for
developing new knowledge (Matusik & Hill, 1998; McGaughey, 2002; Tallman et al., 2004).
Not only is architectural knowledge typically complex and intangible, or tacit; it is also highly
organization-specific and private due to its path-dependency, organizational embeddedness,
and evolutionary nature, spillovers of firm-specific architectural knowledge are therefore not
readily accessible by other firms (Matusik & Hill, 1998). However, Tallman et al. (2004)
propose that architectural knowledge develops also among the firms in a cluster, due to their
close competitive, cooperative, and social interactions. They suggest that possessing
such’quasi-private to cluster members’ knowledge delineates membership of a cluster and
supports commonality of local knowledge by improving the absorptive capacities of cluster-
member firms for each others’ component knowledge.
Architectural knowledge may not be readily transferable, but this does not mean that it
has no effect on the flow of knowledge. Similar architectural knowledge derived from similar
conditions and activities improves the absorptive capacity of a firm for component knowledge
developed in a similar firm (Tallman et al., 2004). In Saxenian’s (1994) comparison of the
Silicon Valley and Rte. 128 clusters in semiconductors, the architecture of the regional
cultures was highly determinate of the ability of member firms to share technical knowhow.
Henderson and Clark (1990) show that firms may be unable to grasp the competitive essence
of new technical advances because of their own preconceptions about the architecture of the
system, so movement of component knowledge between firms and clusters can also be limited
by differences in architectural knowledge.
We propose that changes in knowledge stocks create new forms of knowledge and new
resource configurations in both firms and clusters of firms. We specifically challenge the idea
that architectural knowledge is immobile. Rather, firms can gain access to alternative
7architectures through foreign direct investment, either by locating in a cluster or by acquiring
a unit that is engaged in a foreign cluster and ‘bringing it home’. By doing so, multinational
firms can significantly alter their own architectural understandings and access foreign
component knowledge efficiently.
3. The Initial Model and Key Propositions
The concept of the cluster is based on the premise that firms which are located within a
cluster have key similarities and are able to use these to achieve a greater level of competitive
performance than those which are not (Porter, 1998). For instance, Saxenian’s (1994)
comparative study of the firms in Silicon Valley underlined how the fertile context of a
restricted district (cluster) can provide competitive advantage, particularly in terms of the
growth rates of the firms within one region as compared to another. These are underpinned by
the notion that such clusters contain both passive and active collective efficiencies (Bell et al
2009). Passive efficiencies are those set out by Marshall (1920) and include aspects such as
reduced transportation and specialized labor pools. Active collective efficiencies are related to
the availability of knowledge and other valuable intangible resources to which member firms
actively seek access (Iammarino and McCann, 2006).
P1: Firms within a cluster will outperform firms that are outside.
However, the notion that knowledge and performance are solely and wholly bounded by
geographic limits is clearly over-simplistic. Technology-focused clusters, or “new industrial
districts” (Piore and Sabel, 1986), are not closed systems, but are dependent on external
knowledge flows, often through the internal networks of multinational firms, to maintain and
enhance their potency (Lawson, 1997). The literature of multinational investment suggests
that multinational firms invest in clusters to access locally sticky knowledge (Mudambi,
2008). Networks of alliances have been shown to exist within clusters and to differentiate
knowledge sharing activities (Markusen, 1999; Tallman and Jenkins, 2002), and
8geographically dispersed inter-firm networks are particularly influential in spreading
knowledge and in explaining firm level performance (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996).
P2: Knowledge-based clusters are characterized by strong intra-regional connections
and also by connections to external, even international, knowledge sources and partners.
The economic geography literature tends to focus on the formation of clusters, which
are seen as emergent and firms simply find themselves benefitting from such agglomerations
without necessarily making deliberate attempts to exploit such potential (Piore and Sabel,
1986). Clusters in specific industries develop in specific locations based on historic factors
and on the advantages of co-location for competitors in those industries (Zucker, Darby and
Armstrong, 1998; Tallman and Phene, 2007). However, firms do not only develop within
clusters, they also make strategic decisions to become participants. The international strategy
literature has made much of the locational strategies of multinational firms and the
implications of these choices for firm performance. Off-shore sourcing of both goods and
knowledge development further emphasizes the importance of location-based comparative
advantage, conceived in a narrow and precise manner, as the basis for competitive advantage
among multinational firms (Mudambi, 2008; Doh, Buyaratavej and Hahn, 2008).
P3: Multinational firms proactively implement strategies to take competitive advantage
of location-tied knowledge competencies in choosing to locate in specific clusters.
Studies in the area of alliances and knowledge suggest that knowledge flows more
effectively within company structures and also between formal alliance partners, even within
a cluster, as opposed to between informal partners or different organisations in the same
industry with no formal linkages (Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn & Jaffe, 2006; Almeida and
Kogut, 1999). Studies of multinational firms provide considerable evidence that knowledge
flows more easily within firm boundaries when moving across geographical distances or
crossing national borders, as internalization by a firm reduces both fears of opportunistic
9behaviour in partners and improves joint understanding for more tacit knowledge (Gupta and
Govindarajan, 2000). This contrasts with the rather more passive construct of spillovers of
information within informal social networks that often characterizes work targeted at
knowledge flows within geographically defined areas (Storper, 1995).
P4: Knowledge flows will be greater between formal partners and within multinational
firm structures than through informal relationships.
Although the idea that firms within a cluster operate in a homogenous manner often is
inferred from work on the cluster level of analysis, there is also a wide range of literature that
suggests that firms position and configure themselves in different ways within clusters.
Maskell (2001) distinguishes vertical (supplier-buyer) cluster relationships with a primary
cooperative basis from horizontal cluster relationships that have a primary competitive basis.
Markussen’s (1999) idea of differing cluster structures underlines the potential variation in
firm approaches, as does Tallman and Jenkins’ (2002) description of multiple internal
networks within a single regional cluster. Tallman et al. (2004) further establish that firms
within a cluster retain private, firm-specific, architectural knowledge even as they participate
in the cluster-specific architecture.
P5: Competing firms in the same industry, even the same cluster, will implement widely
differing strategies to reconfigure core technologies in novel ways to build firm-specific
advantage building on cluster-specific architectural knowledge.
To further understand the dynamics of capability-building at the level of geographical
clusters we now look to the development and evolution of a particular form of motor sport –
Formula 1 – which is unusual in being able to allow us to consider both firm and regional
levels of competitive performance, and which has featured geographical concentration in the
construction of the racing automobiles as a characteristic of the industry from its birth.
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4. Refining the Model: The Geography of Competition in Formula 1 (F1)
from 1950 to 2008
Formula 1 provides a unique opportunity to explore the performance of relatively complex,
performance driven organizations that design, manufacture and race their own cars in an
annual series of globally dispersed races. F1 provides a unique balance of technology, capital,
and human resources with an unequivocal performance outcome – winning races – which
makes it a particularly suitable sector for us to examine (Foxall and Johnston, 1991; Jenkins
and Floyd, 2001; Jenkins, in press). First, we are able to examine relative firm performance
in international competition over extended periods and thereby to identify firm level
competitive advantage. Second, we are able to tie location of activities to these performance
outcomes and thereby concern the potential for cluster type effects. Third, the evidence of a
horizontal cluster of firms in the south of the UK is well documented and thereby provides at
least one possible example of the potency and dynamics and clusters. Finally, the wealth of
data, much of it focusing on the turbulent context of technological development and
innovation (Wright, 2001) allows us to consider the role of knowledge flows in the process of
achieving competitive performance.
4.1. Research Method and Data
This study draws on an extensive research database which has been built up over the last ten
years. It was developed to focus on issues relating to competitive performance of individual
teams, technological innovation and development and also the managerial and resourcing
challenges of achieving and sustaining high performance. The database includes details of
race performance from 1950 – 2008; inputs from several hundred specialist periodicals and
other publications, books (including autobiographies of influential individuals) and over fifty
interviews with key players in the industry conducted between 1999 and 2009, all of which
have been recorded and transcribed.
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We describe our research approach as ‘guided induction’ as we use a series of a priori
propositions to guide the way in which we have interrogated the database. This has involved
breaking each proposition into a series of keywords and interrogating the database
accordingly to identify relevant data sources that can be explored in more detail. In this
particular study, we identified two in-depth interviews with individuals who were influential
in different teams and different locations during this period. John Barnard was Technical
Director of UK based McLaren (1981-1986) and Ferrari (1986-1990 & 1992-1996), Ross
Brawn was Technical Director of UK based Benetton (1991 – 1996) and Ferrari (1997 –
2006). Given their relevance to many of the questions we raise we have incorporated sections
of these transcripts to illustrate the case study. This approach is an embedded case design
(Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2003), as we select and explore embedded case units that reflect
particular episodes in the history of F1 during the period in question.
The process we have adopted first maps out the shifts in performance at the firm and
regional level between 1950 and 2008. This provides us with an overview of competitive
performance during this time period. The data allow us to consider the issues related to the
performance of firms and regions. In this case we have focused on race performance, this is
the express objective of the F1 teams themselves and it also provides a close proxy to the
economic success of individual firms, since financial rewards are derived directly from race
performance. We use the concept of podium performance (the first, second and third cars to
finish a race) as this is the most consistent way in which prize money has been allocated in the
period 1950-2008 (Hotten, 1998).
Figures 1 & 2 provide an illustration of the location of F1 teams at two different points
in time. Figure 1 illustrates the locations of the main Formula 1 teams at its beginning in
1950. These are identified as ERA based in Dunstable, UK; Talbot-Darracq based near Paris,
France and Maserati, Ferrari and Alfa Romeo all clustered around Modena in northern Italy.
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INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 2 shows the distribution of F1 teams in 2008. Here we see a stronger presence in
the UK, particularly in the area to the north, west and south of London. The Italian grouping,
although diminished, remains, as does the presence of activity in both Germany (BMW
engines in Munich and Toyota car and engines in Cologne) and France (Renault engines at
Viry-Châtillon).
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
4.2. The Analysis
In this section, we consider the five propositions developed in the literature discussion to
provide a basis for reflecting on the technological development of F1 between 1950 and 2008
and to use the rich data from the case to explore these questions. The study is not deductive,
in that these guiding questions have simply helped to bound our data gathering and analysis
rather than result in a specific test of the propositions. The output should therefore be seen as
exploratory and explanatory rather than conclusive and definitive. We use the case study to
further refine, rather than accept or reject, the initial propositions. At the end of each section
we offer a reconsidered statement of the proposition based on our assessment of the evidence
from the case of Formula 1 racing.
4.2.1. Proposition 1
The first issue that we examine is the potential existence of clusters within this specialised
industry context in the period 1950 - 2008. Much has been written about the existence and
development of the UK’s Motorsport Valley in terms of it being a particularly potent and
influential cluster (Beck-Burridge & Walton, 2000; Henry & Pinch, 2002). We also consider
the question as to whether or not clusters existed to the same extent in Italy, Germany and
France.
13
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The data presented in Figure 3 raises two initial questions. First, how many clusters are
in evidence, and second, what is the relative performance of the firms within the clusters?
Cooke (1999) links Marshall’s concept of industrial districts to three elements: groupings of
sub-contractors, readily available skilled labour and rapid formal and informal
communication across firms and employees reflected by Marshall’s notion of ‘knowledge in
the air’. We suggest that there in fact were two potential clusters in existence in the Formula 1
industry between 1950 and 2008. The first was an emerging Italian cluster which is evident
between 1950 and 1957 and which built on the notion of the ‘Land of Motors’ between
Modena and Bologna and which was comprised of motorsports operations, specialist sports
cars and motorbikes. In his work on the region, Brusco (1986) notes how the performance of
these small specialists is often not recognised in studies of regional economics as these tend to
focus on higher overall levels of productivity and output.
There is evidence of both vertical and horizontal cluster-like activity relating to the
motorsports activity in this region during this period – in particular related to the racing car
design expertise which developed in Alfa Romeo and was then exploited by Ferrari and
Lancia (Yates, 1991).
Many of the engineers that became famous in the region provided expertise that was
utilised by many different companies. For example, Gian Paolo Dallara started his motorsport
career at Maserati with Ramirez and then established the Lamborghini sports car operation
before founding his own company, Dallara, which went on to become a successful single seat
race car manufacturer (Henry et al, 2007). Further evidence of the ‘untraded
interdependencies’ of this region of Northern Italy is provided by the technology which
moved between Lancia and Ferrari, when Lancia decided to withdraw from F1 at the end of
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1955, in an arrangement brokered by Fiat they allowed Ferrari to use the designs of their D50
car in order to create the Ferrari D50 of 1956 (Yates, 1991).
If the nascent Italian motorsports cluster dominated F1 in the early 1950s, it soon
evolved into a vertical cluster consisting of a supply network tied to a single team - Ferrari. In
contrast, the second cluster emerged in the UK around the dominant Cooper team in the late
1950s, and was taken forward by Lotus and others in the mid sixties, this grouping, known as
Motorsport Valley (MSV), became characteristic of the archetypal horizontal cluster with
differing firms coming to the fore in different periods. In particular Lotus dominated much of
the 1960s and 1970s (Crombac, 1986); McLaren the 1980s (Henry, 1999) and Williams the
1990s (Hamilton, 2009).
The statement in P1 is supported by much of the activity during the period when the
clustered firms from the UK dominated the F1 races. However, we can observe particular
periods when individual firms broke through and dominated the cluster firms. One of these is
during the mid-1970s and the other in the period between 1999 and 2008. In this case we
suggest the following phenomena occurred: 1) The Italian motorsport cluster began to
develop in the early 1950s, but due to various environmental shifts failed to become truly
dominant in a sustained way. The Italian motorsport cluster effectively transformed from a
nascent multi-firm cluster into a single-firm centric vertical cluster (Markusen, 1999; Maskell,
2001) based around Ferrari, but with a number of other F1 operations developing in the region
such as Dallara, Minardi and Alfa Romeo. 2) The English cluster displayed the characteristics
of a horizontal, or competitive, cluster and also demonstrated temporary phases of firm level
success, but with consistent cluster domination from the period 1958 through 1973 and from
1980 through to 1999. 3) The domination of Ferrari in particular periods suggests that at times
the dominant-firm vertical network outperformed the broader horizontal cluster due to
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asymmetries in knowledge firms between these regions. Knowledge flows from the UK to
Ferrari, through both targeted hires and direct investment by Ferrari in the UK, allowed it to
build up architectural knowledge in key technologies, but there is little evidence of reciprocal
flows back to the UK cluster, supporting any competitive advantage Ferrari was able to
develop during this period.
F1 shows that while as a group the competing firms located within a horizontal cluster
dominated the industry, they were susceptible to competition from a vertical, or dominant-
firm, cluster in which one central firm was supported by a network of supplier firms and other
organizational relationships (Maskell, 2001; Zucker et al., 1998). For multinational firms
considering locations in which to seek knowledge, this presents both insight and warning –
short term success may not represent long term competitive advantage nor long term superior
knowledge production.
Revised P1: The set of firms within a horizontal cluster generally will outperform
external firms. However, when performance is considered at the firm level, 1) varying
firms within a cluster will demonstrate competitive advantage at different times, and 2)
external competing firms can gain advantage and out-perform firms located within a
cluster for a period.
Thus, we find that firms appear to retain an important degree of distinctiveness within
clusters, with the result that circulating component knowledge of technological innovations
does not benefit all member firms equally. However, the rapid spillover of such innovation
suggests that competitive advantage resides with more deeply embedded capabilities, perhaps
what Tallman et al. (2004) define as “firm specific architectural knowledge”, and describe as
being unavailable to other cluster members. They propose a similar limitation on the
movement of knowledge across cluster boundaries. However, from our evidence it does
appear that externally located firms can tap the component knowledge of distant clusters, as
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Ferrari did by using UK-based subcontractors, and combine such knowledge with their own
distinctive competences to achieve superior performance. The lack of co-located competitors
then permits these firms to sustain advantage longer than is typically the case for cluster-
embedded firms (Maskell, 2001). This suggests that multinational firms can indeed expect to
benefit competitively from sourcing cluster-tied knowledge and combining it with other
knowledge in remote locations, as proposed by Kogut and Zander (1992).
4.2.2. Proposition 2
We consider the performance results described above to be the consequence of knowledge
flows both within and between clusters and external competitors. To demonstrate this, we first
consider the nascent Italian cluster in the period 1950-1957. Here there is very little evidence
of any international knowledge sources or partnerships beyond the cluster. It may be that such
external linkages are likely to develop later in the evolution of a cluster rather than in the early
stages. And indeed, we note later evidence of Ferrari accessing knowledge from Motorsport
Valley in the UK through direct investment in a research facility. One of the first indications
of this was that the first monocoque chassis that Ferrari used in 1972 actually was made for
them by an English sub-contractor for the 312B3 (Yates, 1991). This was followed up later,
when in 1986 Ferrari recruited Technical Director John Barnard to the team:
“Ferrari was one of those teams that was fundamentally an engine company and the chassis
was always second place and he [Enzo Ferrari] saw what was going on in the British side of
Formula 1 with the introduction of composites and so on, so he wanted to lift the chassis side
really. He, through intermediaries, contacted me and the outcome was that I didn’t want to
go to Italy but he wanted me so he said “Okay, do you want to set something up in England?”
and given that opportunity I said “Yes”. (John Barnard, Interview).
Ferrari were accessing very specific technologies (chassis design with the 312B3) and
knowledge from Barnard and his team of composite materials and aerodynamics with the
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GTO operation. However these were temporary phenomena, and once this knowledge had
been absorbed, the operations were moved back to Italy:
“Montezemolo [President of Ferrari] had decided that Ferrari wasn’t being pulled together
from both sides, the English end and the Italian end weren’t being pulled together so they got
John Todt [New General Manager of the F1 operation] along and right from when he came in
initially Todt basically said to me “Look I want it all back in Italy” (John Barnard, Interview)
In the evolution of the UK cluster, a different pattern of international linkages and
knowledge flows is evident. First, many of the technologies used in the early Cooper cars of
the 1950s came from outside the UK, such as the Fiat Topolino suspension components or the
JAP motorcycle drive chain (Lawrence, 1998). However, once this technology was
assimilated into the cars, there is no evidence of any further direct international knowledge
inflows.
In the late 1970s, both Lotus and McLaren were exploring the use of carbon composite
material to create an F1 chassis. Lotus had determined to use a ‘hand laid’ solution where the
composite was laid by hand. McLaren’s John Barnard felt that a strong and lighter structure
would be created by moulding rather than hand laying the carbon. He had tried to locate
expertise in composites in the UK, but had been unsuccessful:
“I started thinking about this carbon thing and went to have a look round at British
Aerospace in Weybridge and see what they were doing, (John Barnard, Interview)
Barnard had worked for a number of years in the US for the Chaparral racing team and
utilized this network to locate an organization in the USA who would be able to help with the
molding process:
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“the next day we got on a plane with the model under our arm, put the model in the overhead
rack, got on the plane with the drawings and we were both off to Salt Lake City and that was
it, (John Barnard, Interview)
In this case we can detect international knowledge sourcing processes both of firms
within a cluster looking outside (McLaren using the composite expertise in the US), and of
isolated firms looking inside the cluster to access particular knowledge (Ferrari establishing a
design operation in the UK). This suggests the following amended Proposition 2:
Revised P2: Linkages within a cluster allow member firms to access knowledge and
capabilities within the cluster. However, external competitors seek specific technologies
from clusters and cluster member firms and use international, networks to create at
least temporary firm-specific competitive advantage.
One way in which clustered firms seem to distinguish themselves from co-located
competitors in a horizontal cluster is by firm-specific external linkages (see also Tallman and
Jenkins, 2002), often to multinational firms. Such linkages develop firm-level architectural
knowledge, and thereby provide technical component knowledge that may be less accessible
to other cluster members than locally–developed technology. The main focus of cluster-
oriented studies of knowledge (Pinch et al., 2003) is on the isolating effect of differential
architectural knowledge. However, it appears that external firms can access component
knowledge held in clusters through mechanisms such as alliances or contracts with cluster
members that can circumvent ignorance of local architectural knowledge. The evidence
suggests that Ferrari typically resisted such MSV-sourced knowledge until its benefits in
racing became obvious, but would then engage key owners of the knowledge rather than
trying to develop something similar on their own. This insight suggests that multinational
firms can indeed access even highly tacit knowledge through location in a geographical
cluster if they are willing to engage closely with local suppliers and competitors.
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4.2.3. Proposition 3
When Honda, the Japanese multinational automobile firm, considered entering F1 in the early
1960s, they went to Brabham, to Cooper and to Lotus to see if these British teams could build
a chassis to take a new engine they had just completed. Their original plan was to provide an
engine for a British constructor to use, ultimately the plan didn’t work due to politics between
the British Constructors and their engine suppliers, but Honda had a clear objective to utilise
the expertise within this region: “Honda had begun thoroughly, sensibly and discreetly by
asking advice from people who knew… Nakamura [Chief Engineer at Honda] and Crombac
[French Journalist who had helped organise the Japanese Grand Prix in 1963] did not only
visit Brabham. They went on to Cooper, then Lotus.” (Hilton, 1989: 15).
Ilmor was founded in January 1984 with the objective to build an engine for the North
American Indy car series. They were able to secure backing from Roger Penske, a US racing
team owner who the owners met while they were working for Cosworth. Penske’s Indy racing
headquarters was based in Reading, Philadelphia, USA but they also had a chassis building
operation based in Poole, Dorset, UK. Penske put up the initial capital for the project and in
return received half of the shares in the business, he was then able to secure further funding
from General Motors to badge the engine as a Chevrolet (Beck-Burridge & Walton, 2000;
Couldwell, 2003).
In 1998 Mercedes badged Ilmor engines won the F1 constructors world championship
with McLaren and the drivers’ championship for Mika Hakkinen. The reason why Mercedes
Benz used Ilmor was summarized by Board member Jürgen Hubbert in 1996: “We could
build an engine that would be powerful and strong. But the trouble would come when it took
three hours to change the engine in the car! It’s not just about power. It’s how to build the
engine, the dimensions, the weight, having the centre of gravity in the right place, and making
it so an engine can be changed in forty-five minutes. Ilmor had the knowledge to bring these
20
things together and we had no doubt that this was the way forward for us.”. (Spreckley, 1999:
146)
Towards the end of the 1990s, major shifts in ownership began to take place with car
manufacturers taking major stakes in the MSV teams. Renault acquired the Benetton team in
2001. DaimlerChrysler (Mercedes) had bought 40% of McLaren’s holding company and also
a similar portion of their specialist engine supplier, Ilmor. Toyota made the decision to enter
F1 from scratch from their motorsport base in Cologne, after spending a year developing their
prototype car at the F1 circuits during 2001 and Honda entered in 2005 through the
acquisition of the British American Racing (BAR) Team based at Brackley in the UK. All of
these activities point towards an endorsement of Proposition 3 that firms, and particularly
multinational firms, will choose to locate in clusters to access specific knowledge. There are
of course exceptions to this. Toyota chose to deliberately locate outside the cluster in order to
make use of their specialist motorsport facility located in Cologne – Team Toyota Europe or
TTE. For many commentators this decision explained why their F1 activity had been
relatively unsuccessful despite significant levels of investment (Jenkins et al 2009). BMW
also followed a similar route when they prematurely ended a relationship to supply the
Williams team with engines to make an acquisition of the Sauber team based in Hinwil,
Switzerland as they regarded the potential for a closer cultural and geographic fit between
BMW and Sauber than with Williams.
Revised P3: Multinational firms proactively implement strategies to access
location-tied knowledge competencies by choosing to locate operations in specific
clusters or alternatively by creating networks outside their home clusters.
F1 has offered situations where members of the horizontal MSV cluster reach out to
suppliers from worldwide locations, and where companies from around the world reach into
MSV for particular skills in building engines and chassis, an expertise in race car design that
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is the basis for the existence of MSV. Ferrari was able to overcome its architectural
inclination to ignore British technological advances in the face of persistent losses, but further
evidence suggests that the benefits of cluster-based competences in F1 were widely
recognized, and also that external partners recognized the differential skills of internal
companies, distinguishing between, for instance, Jordan (a secondary competitor) and
McLaren (a significant innovator) within the MSV cluster. The importance to multinational
firms of location for access to novel firm-specific skills is supported, but our evidence
suggests that multinational firms must understand the differences among members of a
location-tied cluster if they are to benefit from cluster access.
4.2.4. Proposition 4
As many of the F1 Teams are satellite operations of the multinational automotive
manufacturers we are able to explore the concept of ‘within company structures’ and the
potential they may offer. Ross Brawn, has been technical director for several F1 teams,
including Ferrari, and in 2009 owner of his own F1 team, Brawn GP. In 1997 Brawn moved
from the Benetton F1 team, an independent operation located within MSV to Ferrari, owned
by the Fiat Group and whose operation in Maranello also included a separate organisation to
design and manufacture road going Ferrari cars:
Quality control in motor racing is not as good as I experienced when I came here
because the quality control was necessary for a road car group, things like quality control at
your suppliers was new to me. I knew it existed but we have quality control engineers and,
I’m not sure what they’re called, but we have people who are working with our suppliers to
ensure quality all the way through the line(Ross Brawn: Interview)
Brawn also elaborated on how he had managed to unlock some of the potential of the Fiat
Group that prior to his arrival had been underutilised:
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One of the benefits we’ve got from Fiat is a Research Group and Centre Research Fiat
(CRF) which is an independent part of the organisation. It’s been a huge asset to us and it
really wasn’t being used when I came here and we were lucky that [another member of the
team] had come from there and kept telling me what a wonderful place it was and how we
should use it and he knew the right buttons to press and the right people to talk to and they’d
had a little bit of a difficult relationship in the past with CRF but we managed to build it up
and now it’s a key part of our organisation.
Brawn also hinted at some of the potential reasons why these opportunities had not be
realised in the past:
We have a little bit of bureaucracy that comes from being part of a large group and
that’s frustrating sometimes but you have to accept that as part of the necessity of being part
of a large group. (Ross Brawn, Interview)
Revised P4: Knowledge flows will be greater between formal partners and within
company structures than through informal relationships, but such formal flows can be
facilitated or inhibited by informal relationships.
While most of the discussion of knowledge flows in clusters emphasizes informal
relationships, uncompensated spillovers, or untraded interdependencies (Zucker et al., 1998;
Storper, 1995), the experiences of firms and individuals in F1 demonstrate the importance of
formal relationships, whether alliances, subcontracting, or technology supply contracts. For
one thing, formal relationships ensure that accurate and complete component knowledge is
shared – a concern in the case of informal ties, where rumor and partial revelation are more
likely. In cases such as Ferrari deciding to commit to aerodynamics or other system-level
architectural redefinitions, access to full and complete knowledge seems particularly
important. However, it is suggested that the above is moderated by the informal relationships
that exist around the formal knowledge flow. The benefits to external firms of informal ties to
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members of clusters seem undeniable, but more in support of formal ties that provide fully
compensated access to complete bodies of knowledge than as substitutes for contractual ties.
4.2.5. Proposition 5
In the Formula 1 case we can discern two quite distinctive sets of architectural knowledge
which give emphasis to different areas of component knowledge. In the nascent Italian
cluster, we can see a clear focus on engine design as the central element of racing car design,
an architecture which endures in the history of Ferrari in its vertical cluster. In the British
cluster, we see first an emphasis on chassis design and weight distribution (to improve the
handling of the car) which is followed by aerodynamics and the use of composites on the part
of all competitors. In the later part of the period, we suggest a significant shift in the
architectural knowledge of Ferrari to provide a more balanced understanding of the areas of
engine, chassis and aerodynamics.
Founder and CEO of Lotus, Colin Chapman’s philosophy of starting the design process
with the chassis put him in direct contradiction with the Italian F1 teams such as Ferrari, as
driver Nigel Mansell, who had worked for both observed: "Enzo Ferrari believed that the
engine was the most important part of the racing car; Colin [Chapman] believed it was the
chassis." (Mansell, 1996: 126).
By 1960, the dominance of the British mid-engine concept was clear. Up to this point,
Enzo Ferrari had resisted this innovation, maintaining that the engine should always be in
front of the driver, supporting his position with the often repeated the expression that the ‘ox
pulls the cart’ (Yates, 1991: 282). However, the evidence from race results was undeniable,
and Ferrari had to build a lighter mid-engine car, which they did with the Tipo 156
‘sharknose’to win a further world title in 1961. However Chapman was to take his ideas on
chassis development a stage further in 1962 with the development of the Lotus 25 monocoque
chassis, using a fabricated structure rather than a tubular frame to form the chassis - a concept
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that was quickly adopted by the other teams based in MSV (Lawrence, 1998). The advances
made in chassis construction by the MSV teams created problems for Ferrari (Nye, 1977), so
that not until 1964 was the Ferrari 158 was launched with a monocoque type chassis similar to
the Lotus 25 of 1962, suggesting that Ferrari were two years behind MSV technology.
However, the most significant blow to Italian performance was to come with the Ford
DFV engine. This was first used competitively in a Lotus 49 at the Dutch Grand Prix in 1967
and caused a sensation by winning its first race (Robson, 1999). The Ford DFV was created
by a joint venture between the Ford Motor Company, who funded the project, Cosworth
Engineering, based in Northampton, UK, who designed and built the engine, and Lotus, based
in Norfolk, who developed the Lotus 49 using an innovative ‘semi-monocoque’ design where
the monocoque finished just behind the driver allowing the engine to form a structural part of
the car thereby reducing weight and maximizing rigidity (Robson, 1999).
Although the original intention was for the Ford DFV to be supplied exclusively to
Lotus, Ford made the decision to make it available to other F1 teams in 1968 (Crombac,
1986). It dominated F1 through the early seventies and created a significant growth in the
number of F1 constructors based in MSV. In 1969 and 1973, a car with a Ford DFV engine
won every Grand Prix, the only occasions in the history of F1 that a single engine totally
dominated a season. Effectively, the DFV meant that the MSV teams could focus on chassis
performance and then acquire a highly competitive engine at relatively low cost (Jenkins et al,
2009).
The late 1970s and early 80s were dominated by a radical shift in F1 car design –
ground-effect aerodynamics. Aerodynamics had been developed by the MSV teams in an
effort to increase grip, using aerodynamic devices known as ‘wings’ to increase downforce as
velocity increased – the opposite to lift created by the wing of an aircraft. Ground-effect took
things a stage further by using the air flowing under the car to create a low pressure area
25
which effectively sucked the car onto the track. This innovation was led once again by Lotus
(Crombac, 1986; Wright 2001).
The Lotus 79 won the 1978 world championship, establishing ground-effect technology
as a dominant concept in F1 - driver Mario Andretti described the car as being ‘painted on the
road’ (Crombac, 1986: 284). Many constructors subsequently attempted to imitate the design.
Quick imitation was practical for many teams, as the majority was using the same engine
configuration as Lotus [Ford DFV] and therefore had only to concentrate on re-design of the
chassis. The narrow profile Ford V-8 was ideal for this application. Ferrari’s commitment to
the Flat-12 engine meant that they were unable to create the narrow chassis profile needed to
locate the ground-effect venturi passage on either side of the engine, and as a result Ferrari
became uncompetitive during 1977 and 1978. However Lotus themselves found that their
competitors within MSV, in particular Williams, had developed a more effective version of
the design, as summarized by former Lotus Technical Director Martin Ogilvie:
…and then of course Williams went and thought about it and then came up with a much
better car mainly because they realized the importance of the chassis structure in creating
downforce. (Martin Ogilvie: Interview)
The above charts the shift in the architectural knowledge of the UK cluster between a
focus on chassis to develop to one which integrated both chassis development and
aerodynamics. During this period (1980s and early 1990s) Ferrari were uncompetitive and so
embarked on a program of radical change which involved bringing in new leadership and also
locating the design operation back in Maranello. Ross Brawn, Technical Director of Ferrari,
summarizes some of the key reasons for Ferrari’ return to success in the early 2000s as:
If we had an innovation here it’s the fact that we combine the engine and the chassis
together as one whole but we apply that principle to all areas of the car with the electronics,
the engine, the chassis, the aerodynamics, the structure, it all had to be a whole there was no
26
point in having one area very strong and the other area weakA Ferrari is a Ferrari, it’s not
an engine, it’s not a chassis, it’s not an aero package, it’s a Ferrari. (Ross Brawn: Interview).
This integrated approach to car design allowed Ferrari to dominate F1 up until 2004, at
which point two MSV based teams, Renault and McLaren, were starting to make inroads by
following the Ferrari approach of integrating engine, chassis and aerodynamics development.
Both of these teams had their own dedicated engine operations. McLaren used the Ilmor
operation which subsequently became wholly owned by Mercedes Benz and renamed
Mercedes Benz High Performance Engines. Renault F1 engines were designed and
manufactured at Viry-Châtillon near Paris, however a small engine design team were also co-
located at their main F1 design and assembly operation at Enstone in Oxfordshire in order to
ensure that the design process was as integrated as possible. The competition among these
three teams continued to the end of the period, with Ferrari securing the constructors
championship in both 2007 and 2008.
Revised P5: Competing firms in the same cluster can use unique firm-specific
architectural knowledge to build competitive advantage while applying cluster-specific
knowledge. External or multinational firms with very different architectural knowledge
are slower to integrate knowledge developed in clusters.
In the case of Formula 1, we see this phenomenon in several situations. In particular,
Lotus was the source of the innovations such as semi-monocoque construction, ground-effect
aerodynamics and the use of composite materials. However, Lotus found only limited
competitive success from these innovations as other MSV firms quickly understood and
incorporated them into their own repertoires of capabilities. Ferrari, the sole surviving Italian
firm after 1957, was slow to recognize the potential value of each of these innovations,
largely because its engine-focused architectural understanding of racing success simply failed
to comprehend the potential value of chassis and body-related innovations. We might also
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consider that the loss of its regional competitors had reduced the direct pressure on Ferrari to
innovate during this period, limiting its immediate incentive for disruptive architectural
change (Maskell, 2001). For multinational firms seeking cluster-based knowledge, this
insight suggests a patient approach to strategic re-combinations of knowledge (Kogut and
Zander, 1992), as full understanding of captured knowledge is an involved and difficult
process.
5. Conclusions
Our examination of the evolutionary patterns in the performance of clusters, networks and
firms has provided a further refinement of some of the potential relationships that both
support and change the nature of clusters and the opportunities available for multinational
firms when choosing the location of new operations. The revisions to our initial propositions
suggest that there is a symbiotic relationship between clusters and firms’ external networks.
These relationships allow the development of new knowledge and capabilities within clusters,
but also allow external or multinational firms to access such capabilities and to develop their
own distinctive resource combinations that may allow them to outperform the cluster-based
firms.
Multinational firms, therefore, should consider current knowledge stocks to establish
whether location within a cluster will bring greater benefit due to knowledge inflows than the
outflows which could shorten the potential time period of a competitive advantage.
However, linkages between cluster based and external firms are an inherent part of the
dynamics of the. Multinational entrants to clusters benefit the clusters as well as
themselves.There may be strong reasons which relate to protecting proprietary knowledge or
to ensuring cultural fit (as was the case with BMW and Sauber) which means MNEs choose
not to locate within a cluster. Also, when establishing ties to cluster members, multinational
firms must recognize that these are not homogenous – only a few of the cluster members are
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likely to be the real innovators.Although at a macro level the importance of formal structures
to enhance knowledge flow may be regarded as self-evident, the Ferrari experience suggests
that formal relationships may only become powerful sources of knowledge if the appropriate
informal structures and relationships are in place. This suggests that competitive advantage at
the MNE level may be dependent on the ability to support formal structures with informal
mechanisms and relationships to enhance such processes.
Finally, we suggest that a key part of the challenge for MNEs in managing knowledge
flows within clusters is ensuring that their architectural knowledge is sufficiently able to
connect with cluster level knowledge and thereby benefit from the inflows from spillovers,
but also sufficiently distinctive and private to ensure that some level of competitive advantage
can be achieved. This is an important and subtle distinction and one which warrants further
exploration in other technological sectors to define how such a balance can be achieved and
maintained.
Our study has distinct limitations. It addresses a single industry, one that is in many
ways unique, and our propositions need to be applied in other contexts. It is based on
combining varying types of data in the case analysis, with the focus on developing theoretical
frameworks rather than testing them. Cross-industry quantitative empirical studies of
international samples of clusters, firms and networks are needed to confirm or deny fully our
propositions. However, this unique context does allow us to consider a wide range of data
and phenomena at both the cluster and firm level of analysis, such a rich description of a
particular situation being particularly valuable for theory development.
Our study suggests that multinational firms can realistically hope to benefit from
uprooting, transporting, and recombining even architectural knowledge from within clusters –
but only with difficulty and awareness of the pitfalls and the prospects. The value to a firm
based in one location of incorporating ideas and innovations from another location,
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particularly a location that provides the shared, integrated knowledge of a cluster, can be very
high, especially when the core architectural knowledge being imported is more distinctive.
However, in F1, as in other cases, it seems that the greater the potential value, the greater the
difficulty of transmitting knowledge from a firm or cluster in one place to a firm or cluster in
another place. Seeking advantage by seeking exotic knowledge in far-flung locations is a
strategy that is being proposed more often for multinational, but should be subject to careful
scrutiny before being implemented – its costs are high and its benefits seem uncertain from
what we observe in the world of Formula 1 racing.
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Figure 1: Location of main Formula One Entrants, 1950
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Figure 2: Location of Formula One Entrants, 2008
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Figure 3:
Proportion of Podiums Achived by Country 1950-2008
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